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In May 1992, the World Bank hosted a Railway  plan should define the market; project the level
Roundtable in Vienna, Austi!a, attended by  of activity (tons, ton-kilometers and freight
transport ministers, advisors, and senior railway  tariffs, passenger-kilometers and passenger
staff from the Central and Eastern European  fares) for all business activities; include a five-
(CEE) countries. The Roundtable reviewed  year financial plan for the different lines of
recent trends in the railways' roles in these  railway business (to malce options concrete); and
countries and identified appropriate actions to  define all government policies and changes that
address emerging transport issues in the CEE  would put the railway on a level playing field
region. The Bai-  prepared this strategy paper  with competing modes of transportation.
based on the discussions and the apparent
widespread consensus that emerged at the  Two items on the agenda for change (among
Roundtable.  many others) are to:
The financial situation of the CEE railways  *  Convert the current railway "enterprise" or
is beginning to deteriorate rapidly, and the CEE  ministry into a joint stock company (JSC) or, at
railways are not well positioned to provide good,  least, an independent enterprise operating under
reliable service to their increasingly market-  normal commercial law. The board of directors
driven customers. These countries are thus under  should include representatives from govemment,
increasing pressure to restructure their railways  the railway executive and high-level business or
to relieve financial pressures and meet future  public representatives from outside of govem-
needs.  ment. Formation of a JSC or independent
enterprise does not necessarily imply privatiza-
Railways in market economies have faced a  tion of the railway because the underlying assets
steadily declining role in the transport market,  may well remain in public hands. The objective
and have typically dealt with emerging problems  is to change the enterprises' authority and
by "tinkering at the margin" - for example, by  enhance their commercial orientation.
debt write-offs - and thus delaying attacking
their underlying structural problems. Many of  *  Have the explicit mission of the railway be
these govenmments  have come to the conclusion  to operate freight and intercity passenger ser-
that "drastic surgery" is required - as illustrated  vices on a commercial basis, with revenues from
by the British, German, and Japanese railways.  services covering all costs, including a return on
investment. "Social" services, such as urban
The agenda for change that emerged from  passengers, should be identified and supported
this Roundtable emphasized developing a  by the approptiate govemmental agencies.
strategic plan for restructuring the railway. This
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the fmdings of work under way in theBank. Anobjectiveof  the series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully pol shed. The findings,  interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers c 4o not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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CENTRAL  AND  EASTERN  EUROPEAN
ECONOMIES
INTRODUCFION
1.  In May 1992,  the World  Bank  hosted  a Railway  Roundtable  in Vienna,  Austria,  attended  by
transport  ministers,  advisers,  and senior  railway  staff from Central  and Eastern  European  (CEE) 1'
countries. The purpose  of the Roundtable  was to review  recent and prospective  trends in the role
of the railways  in these  countries  and, based  on experience  with similar  situations  in other  countries,
identify  appropriate  actions to address emerging  transport issues in the CEE region.  While the
Roundtable  did not attempt  to reach agreement  on a formal  communique  summarizing  concluslons,
this strategy  paper has been prepared  by the Bank  on the basis of the discussions  and the apparent
widespread  consensus  emerging  at the Roundtable.
2.  The financial  situation  of CEE railways  is beginning  to deteriorate  rapidly. In Hungary,  the
railway  (MAV)  operating  loss doubled  between  1987  and 1991,  is forecast  to doubie  again  in 1992
and accounts  payable  have  almost  trebled  since  1989. In Czechoslovakia,  the railway  (CSD)  subsidy
doubled  juist between 1990 and 1991, and is climbing  rapidly in 1992.  In Poland, the ratio of
operating  revenues  (before  subsidy)  to operating  costs fell from 87 percent to 70 percent between
1988  and 1991.  In Croatia,  the same ratio fell from 83 percent  to 49 percent between 1985 and
1991. All of the CEE railways  are losing traffic and market share, with rail traffic in Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia  now hovering  at about 40 percent below 1988 levels.  In Bulgaria,
despite substantial  tariff increases,  revenues  fell far short of covering  working  expenses,  and the
railway  is facing  bankruptcy. Further,  there is clear  evidence  that the transport  systems  of the future
are going  to require  high quality  and reliable  service,  requirements  which  the CEE railways  are not
now  well  postured  to meet. All of these  factors  are working  together  to cause  governments  and  their
railways  to embark  on programs  to restructure  the railways  to meet future needs. These  pressures
have  four sources,  of which  three have  tended  to reduce  the railway's  role and  one has acted,  or may
act to increase  the railway's  role slightly.
3.  First, the formerly  socialist  CEE  economies  are undergoing  a basic  change  in structure,  away
from the production  of basic  materials  and  heavy industry  (both  natural  rail markets)  and  toward  the
production  of manufactured  goods and services  where transport speed  and reliability  requirements
are higher. Secondly,  as the transport infrastructure  develops,  markets are deregulated,  and road
transport  privatized, competition  from other modes of transport, especially  road, will erode the
traditional  market share which railways have held.  Thirdly, the loci of economic  activity are
becoming  less centralized,  placing higher emphasis  than in the past on the ability of a mode to
provide door-to-door  services, and to provide  convenient  connections  with road-oriented  Western
It  For purposes  of this  paper, "Central  and Eastern  Europe" includes  Albania,  Bulgaria,  The Czech  Republic,
Hungary,  Poland, Romania,  and The Slovak  Republic.  It does not include  the Commonwealth  of Independent  States
(CIS) countries or the Former Soviet Union  (FSU) countries,  which may (or may not) have similar problems. In
this paper, "Czechoslovakia," "CSFR," and 'CSD"  refer to the former Czech  and Slovak  Federal Republic  and
the railway which  existed before these  countries decided to separate. At the present  time, it appears  that many of
the prescriptions  in this paper may  apply to at least some of the CIS countries  as well, but exactly  how, and in what
relative proportions,  is not yet known.2  Railway  Reform in the Cetral  and Eastern  European (CEE)  Economies
provide door-to-door  services, and to provide convenient  connections  with road-oriented  Western
Europe. The fourth  factor,  operating  in the direction  of increased  rail demand,  is the environment:
all economies  are facing  the problem  of growing  air and  noise  pollution  in their major  urban  centers.
Under  certain  circumstances,  rail's environmental  advantages  will encourage  more  rapid  development
of rail services  in urban commuter  applications.
4.  All of  the  above considerations  will operate with particular force in  the  structural
transformation  which the former socialist  economies  in the CEE and the CIS countries  are now
undergoing.  This is because  the past practice  of emphasizing  production  of basic  industrial  materials
and on under-pricing  of transportation  relative  to other activities  has acted  to create excessive  use
of transport.  Figure 1, for example,  compares  the intensity  of transport  use (measured  in ton-km
of total transport per US$ of GDP - purchasing  power corrected). 2'  The uniform ranking of
socialist  economies  toward  the top furnishes  strong  evidence  of their excess  use of transport  per unit
of economic  activity  compared  with use of transport in market economies. Figures 2-5 display
typical  examples  of the reasons  for transport  intensity:  all of the primary  commodities  and materials
of construction,  and most of the heavy, low value commodities  generating  tran.port activity, are
produced  in much greater quantities  in the CEE countries  and the former  Soviet Union  (FSU)  than
in the western  economies.
Figure 1
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2/  This is at best an approximate  calculation. Detailed  studies  broadly  confirm  the conclusion  that the former
socialist economies  are;  highly transport intensive. See, for example, Esrm  Bennatha-, Julie Fraser, and Louis S.
Thompson, "Freight Transport Demand, Determinants  and Intensity," World Bank, INUTD, September  1992.Railway  Reforn in the Central  and Eastern European (CEE)  Economies  3
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5.  ;Figure  6 carries  the transport  intensity  issue  one step further. It shows  for socialist  and r.on-
socialist  countries  the degree  to which  rail dominates  the surface  transport  market available  to rail
and truck. Figure  6 also takes  into account  the size of the country,  by comparing  rail share  with the
average  length  of haul for rail, an atajustm-'nt  to take into account  rail's advantage  over longer  trip
lengths. From Figure  6 it is clear that  the -ocialist  economies  make  a distinctively  higher  use of rail.
As these economies  restructure,  it seems  equally  clear that there will be a shift in the modal  balance
of transportation  away from rail and toward truck.  Figures 7-9 display  much the same point for
passenger  services  in the socialist  economies,  showing  that rail occupies  a disproportionate  share of
the passenger  market  when compared  with  the developed  economies  of the West, primarily  because
the rates of automobile  ownership  have been a-tificially  constrained,  but are now growing rapidly
in the CEE and CIS countries.
Figure  6
Rail  Share  of Rail  + Truck  Ton-Km  - 1  988
vs Length  of Haul  for Developing,
Developed  and  Socialist  Countries
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Figure  7
Rail  ParsKilometers per Capita (000)
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6.  Figure  10 shows the changes  already  happening  in the CEE  and CIS  countries  as compared
with France  and the former  West  Germany.3 '  As Figure  10 shows,  rail freight  activity  in the CEE
countries  has  now  fallen to 60 percent,  or less  (to only 25  percent  on the DR),  of its level in 1988.
To some extent,  of course,  this loss of rail traffic  merely  reflects  (hopefully) temporary  factors  such
as the drop  in total  economic  activity  in these  economies  and disruptions  to  rail traffic  among  the
former  socialist  countries  (especially  with  the former  Yugoslavia).  At the seme  time,  though,  it is
clearly  early  evidence  of the more permanent  structural  changes  describod  above.  Much of the rail
traffic  that has been  lost will never return,  and total rail traffic  is not likely to enjoy  1988 levels  for
many years,  if ever.  Trends  in the CIS are, as yet, not as dramatic  as in the CEE countries,  but that
is  primarily  because  economic  restructuruig  activity  in  the  CIS began  later,  has  proceeded  more
slowly,  and  still has  not undergone  the  same degree  of change  as in the CEE  countries.
Figure  10
Rail  Freight  Traffic  Trends  in  Europe
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3/  Fortunately, the data are still available to compare the former West Germany wvth the former Egst
Germany.  Traffic on the Deutsche  Bundesbahn  (DB) in (former) West Germany  has remained stable, while rail
traffic on the Deutsche  Reichsbahn  (DR) in the former East Germany  has collapsed.Railway Reform  in the  Centrul  and Easterns  European (CEE)  Economies  7
7.  The combined results of these forces aLting together seem very clear:  first, the total use of
transport  per  unit  of  economic  activity by  the  restructuring  socialist  economies will  decline
significantly; second, the role which rail plays In the transport system is also going to decline.  As
a result, the process cf transition will lead to a more rapid decrease in rail activity than in overall
economic activity, and a much alower increase (if any)4' in rail activity as the economies bottom-out
and begin to grow again.  In a general way, this broad transition from basic production to services
has occurred since World War II in all thA  west.rn economies, with a resulting decrease in the role
of rail (see Figures 11-14, for example).  The difference in the case of the CEE and CIS countries
is that,  whereas the broad transition took place over three to four decades in the West,  it will
necessarily be compressed into a Faiuch  shorter time period (as short as five to ten years)  in the
formerly socialist economies, and the kind of giadual adaptation which occurred in the western
economies simply wiil not be feasible.
Figure 11
Shares  of  the  US  Freight  Market
(Percent  of  Tonne-Km)
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4/  The future  of rail  traffic will depend  on the  balance  between  structural  and cyclical  effects, which  will vary
from  country  to country depending  on their  stage in the restructuring  process.8  Railway  Refonrr  In the Central  and  Enstern  European  (CEE)  Economies
Figure 12
Shares  of  the  U.S.  Public  Passenger
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8.  This  rapid and  wrenching change in  the  railway role means that there must be  a
corresponding  change  in the organization  of the railway  and in its relationship  with the government
and the transport sector.  W!'en the government  commanded  the economy,  the railway role was
simple: just as all other sectors  of the economy  were required  to do, the railway  served  the "Plan."
As competitive,  market-oriented  structures  begin  to drive  the economy,  CEE and CIS railways  must
make  the same  transition  in organization  and mentality  as has been, or is being, made in the market
economies. The railway  can no longer focus on the operation  of trains and the repair of track (a
production-driven  role); it must instead  focus  on the needs  of the customer.
9.  This will not be a simple  transition. Nor will it take place  on the same time scale  in all the
CEE economies  because some are already further ahead than others in the transition.  This
restructuring  of the railway may also not include  exactly  the same aspects  or facets in all of the
different countries  because the size and function  of the railway varies considerably  among the
economies  (see Figure  6).  This  being  said, there  are a series  of initiatives  which, with an appropriate
adjustment  for the particular  characteristics  of each economy,  should  probably  form an underlying,
comprehensive  agenda  for use in the restructuring  process. This agenda  is described  below.
AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE
10.  As noted in paragraph  7, railways  in market  economies  have faced  a steadily  declining  role
in the transport market.  Typically,  rail management  and governments  dealt with the emerging
problems by  "tinkering  at the margin" -- for example, by debt write-offs -- only to find that the
problem  reappeared  within  a few  years. Following  a series  of such failures  to attack  the underlying
cause  of the malaise,  governments  in the market  economies  are increasingly  coming  to the conclusion10  Railway  Reform in the Central  and Eastern  European (CEE)  Economies
that "drastic surgery" is required.  This is illustrated  by the current approaches  of the British,
German, and Japanese railways. 5 s  Because  of the much greater speed at which the changes  are
occurring in the CEE countries, and much more severe budgetary constraints faced by their
governments,  the CEE countries  cannot  afford  the luxury  of gradual  adaptation:  bolder  initiatives  are
required. As important  as the statement  of what the future  railway  will do, is the statement  of what
it will not do.  In this connection,  it is important  not to confer  on the railway  exclusive  rights  (e.g.,
for intermodal  traffic) which might have the effect of restricting  competition  and the role of the
private sector.
11.  Develop  a Strategic  Plan for Restructuring  the Railway. The most important  initiative  to
be undertaken,  and it should  be done as rapidly  as possible,  is the development  of a strategic  plan
for the railway. This plan, developed  jointly by the cognizant  ministry  or ministries 6' and railway
management,  should  include  market definition  and projection  of activity  (tons, ton-km  and freight
tariffs, passenger-km  and fares)  for all business  activities.  Next, the strategic  plan  should  include
a five year financial  plan for the railway  by lines of business,  showing  revenues,  costs and profits,
PSO contract  payments  (see footnote  7 below), and all other payment  amounts  and sources. The
financial  plan is important  because it puts numbers  on the various policy  options -- thus making
concrete, and probably more difficult, that which would otherwise  be abstract.  Another  major
element  of the strategic  plan is a definition  of all government  policies  and changes  therein  which  will
put the railway on a level playing field with all the competing  modes of transportation. 7 The
overall  purpose is to ensure that the new railway has a valid mission  and adequate  resources  and
authority  to accomplish  that mission.
12.  Joint Stock Company. As soon as possible,  the current  railway "enterprise"  or ministry
should  be converted  into a Joint Stock  Company  (JSC)  or, at least, a limited  liability  company  under
normal  commercial  law. 8'  The JSC should  have a Board  of Directors  selected  from government,
the Railway  Executive  and high level  business  representatives  from outside  government.  This  action
would  have the effect  of transforming  the identity  and mranagement  practices  (and public  image)  of
the railway  toward that of a commercial  enterprise  and away from that of a government  ministry.
This would  include,  Inter  alla, changing  the railway's  accounting  standards  to those  of a corporation
5/  See Report  of the Railway  Reform  Commission  (Germany),  Fukui, and British  Government  White  Paper.
6/  In general, the cognizant  ministry should be the Transport Ministry.  Under certain circumstances,  the
Ministry of Finance and/or the immediate  office  of the Chief Executive  of the country may  also be included  in the
group preparing the strategic plan.
7/  See Huff and  Thompson  for a more thorough  discussion  of the content  of a strategic  plan, and for further
discussion  of performance  agreements. In the terms used in that document, the objective in this paragraph is the
preparation  of the strategic plan (SP).  It would be the responsibility  of the new railway management  to develop
the management  plan (MP) as it is described  in Huff and Thompson.
S/  rTe terms "Joint Stock Company" or "limited liability company" have slightly different meanings in
different  countries. What is meant  here by JSC is that  the new railway  will issue stock certificates  which  represent
the equity  owaership  of the company,  the owner(s)  of these stocks  will have full control  over the business  decisions
of the company,  and that the liability of the shareholders  shall be limited to the value of the stock.  Placing the
company  under normal commercial  law means  that the company  should function  like  any other commercial  entity.
It should not enjoy the sovereign  powers or rights of a government  ministry. It can sue or be sued, must pay its
obligations,  and can go bankrupt.Railway  Refonn in the Central  and Eastern European (CEE) Economies  11
under  the commercial  laws of the country  rather than  a government  ministry,  and a shift in the status
of the  labor  force  from  civil service  to corporate  status.
13.  Formation  of  a  JSC  does  not  necessarily  imply  privatization  of  the  railway:  the  initial
objective  is, instead,  to secure  the changes  in enterprise  authority  and  commercial  orientation  that
the enterprise  form will bring.  Among  other things,  however,  the JSC  form will make dealing  with
the truly  private  sector easier  and more effective,  and will facilitate the contracting  and joint ventures
which  will represent  a better  balance  between  private  and public.  At  some point  in the future,  the
JSC  form would be helpful in facilitating  true privatization,  when that becomes  appropriate,  through
sale  of  branch  lines,  franchising  of  particular  operations,  or  other  possibilities. 9'  Certainly,
adopting  eventual  privatization  as  a  serious  commitment  will  exert  useful  discipline  on  rail
management.
14.  The  Railway  Mission.  The railway  shall have  the explicit  mission  to  operate  freight  and
intercity  passenger  services  on  a  commercial  basis;  i.e.,  revenues  from  these  services  should  be
adequate  to  cover  all  costs  associated  with  providing  them,  including  a  return  on  investment
(preferably,  if the playing  field  is to be kept level,  at least roughly  equivalent  to that earned  by  its
private  sector competitors).  In general,  the railway  approach  to these markets  should be exactly  that
of  a  commercially  driven  enterprise:  prices  should  be  as  high  as  competition  permits,  and  costs
should  be as  low as  is consistent  with the  level  of quality  the market  demands.  The  suburban  or
commuter  services  of the railway  should  be operated  efficiently  under  a contract  with government
(or  governments  -- there  is likely to be  a role for  regional  and  local  governments  in the  definition
of,  and funding  for,  local  suburban  services),  under  which  the railway  shall be compensated  for all
appropriate  costs of an efficient entity,  including  investment,  not covered  by fares or Public Service
Obligation  (PSO)  payments.' 0'  It  is  vital  to  agree,  also,  that  whatever  is not profitable  and  not
subject to adequate  PSO support  can and should be dropped,  solely in the business judgement  of the
new railway:  PSO services  must be terminated  if the PSO payments  are not made.  While  much of
the  discussion  in  paragraphs  3-6  focussed  on  the  structural  changes  in  rail's  role  in  the  freight
market,  it is important  to recognize  that probably the biggest  single adjustment  that has to be made
in CEE  rail  operations  is on the passenger  side.  Paseenger  revenues  are often  covering  only one-
third  of costs  on average,  with many services  covering  much less than this.  The railways,  and their
governments,  need  to consider  very  carefully  their  future role  in such markets.
15.  The  Contract  Plan  (or Performance  Agreement).  The  intent of performance  agreements
is to clarify  the relationship  of the railway  with the go /ernment  in those cases where  the government
wishes  to  keep  a  continuing  role  in policies  and  operating  practices  of the  railway.  In general,  a
9/  See Moyer and Thompson, "Options for Reshaping  the Railway," The World Bank, Infrastructure  and
Urban  Department, WPS 926, June 1992, and Louis S. Thompson,  "Increasing the Role of the Private Sector in
Railway  Transport," paper for World Conference  on Transportation  Research (WCTR),  July 1992.
10  PSO payments can be made  either as operating  support  or as capital support.  A public authority might,
for example, acquire passenger rolling stock and transfer it to the railway for operation. The railway would not
need to earn a rate of return on such public investments. See "Cost and Revenue  Allocation"  below.  'Public
Service Obligation," or PSO, has become  a common  term in Europe to describe the circumstance  under which a
public entity wishes the railway to provide  a service for which revenues  cannot, or will not be permitted  to, cover
costs.  Typical  examples  are found in urban commuting,  but also include student  discounts,  discounts  to the elderly
or veterans, and rural passenger  services,  among  others. Though  not often viewed  this way, other  examples  should
be uneconomic  branch  lines carrying  mostly  freight, and the added costs  of mandated  excess  labor where  the railway
is, in effect, acting as a welfare agency on the government's  account and under the government's  instructions.12  Railway Refonn  in the Central  and Eastern European (CEE)  Economies
thorough transition to the JSC form, and a clear statement  of the new corporation's roles and
responsibilities,  combined  with a suitable  Board of Directors and the signing of PSO contracts,
should  obviate  the need for a performance  agreement  between  railway  and government.''I
16.  Costs  and Revenue  Allocation. The railway  should  develop  and implement  (with  agreement
from the government)  a reporting  system  for allocating  the railway's  costs and  revenues  among  the
markets designated  as lines of business. This cost and revenue  allocation  system  should include
agreed  formulae  and methods  for PSO  contract  billing  so that PSO  payments  can be audited  ex  post,
but will not be subject  to dispute  and approval  prior to payment. However,  adjustment  of the scale
of rail operations  to the new market  realities  should  not await  the development  of refined  cost and
revenue allocation  methods. Even on the basis of existing  allocations,  or other rough "rules of
thumb," the grossly  inviable  businesses  can be identified,  and remedial  action  taken.
17.  Regulation. The railway's  freight  tariffs should  not be regulated  at all, except  in those  cases
where the railway is shown  to be abusing  its monopoly  position. 1 2'  That is, regulation  should  be
passive  rather than  interventionist.  The railway  should  not have to file tariff schedules  or contracts
as a matter of routine; the regulator  should intervene  only in response  to shipper  grievances. In
general, the need for railway freight  regulation  will decline  rapidly  as competition  emerges  and as
shipper  choice  becomes  more important  on transport  decisions. The railway's intercity  passenger
fares should  also not be regulated  except, perhaps, for sliding  price controls  during the transition
period when all other prices are changing. Railway  PSO fares should  be set by the terms of the
contract  with the governmental  authorities: in general,  the railway would  be compensated  for the
difference  between costs allowable  under the contract and fares, and the contract  should contain
incentives  for productivity  improvement,  such as price cap regulation. An appropriate  regulatory
authority  or agency may need to be established  in order to assess efficiency  and adjudicate  cost
reporting  and allocation  in order  that acceptable  and adequate  information  is available  for regulatory
and PSO payment  purposes. This paragraph  assumes,  of course, that all other modes, especially
trucking  and buses, will be similarly  unregulated.
18.  Government  Support. Apart  from PSO  compensation  ("railway  mission"  above)  and initial
assistance  in making  up for any deferred maintenance  which may exist ("sins of the past" below),
government  support  should  be limited  to equity  investment  in and loans  (on essentially  commercial
terms) to the railway.  There may be economic  justification  for making capital grants to the
commercial  railway  (freight  and intercity  passenger,  as per "railway  mission" above)  for purposes
such as a one-time  correction  of the deferred  maintenance  backlog  of the past, once the enterprise
has been set up with an appropriate  initial  balance  sheet tailored  to its future  earning potential  and
II/  BR does not have an explicit performance  agreement with its government.  Amtrak does not have a
performance  agreement  with the US Government  because  Amtrak's status as an "as if for profit" corporation  under
District of Columbia  law, combined  with government  membership  on the Amtrak Board (and the need to submit
Amtrak's subsidy and capital budget to the President  and the Congress  for approval)  make additional  agreements
unnecessary. The new JR companies  in Japan  do not have  performance  agreements  as their profitability  targets are
sufficient  for guidance  and evaluation.
12/  Abuse of monopoly  position  can be evidenced  either by individual  tariffs which are far above their cost,
or by the generation  of total  revenues  greater  than those  needed to provide  earnings  adequate  for capital replacement
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borrowing  needs.1 31 Government  may choose to pay some of its PSO contract compensation  in
the form of capital  grants (e.g., for new line construction  or coaches  for commuter  operations)  and
indeed  this form  of compensation  should  replace  ongoing  compensation  for revenue  shortfalls  vis-vis
operating  costs, because  it is more explicit  and less "open-ended." The issue of capital  grants and
PSO support  will probably  have a resolution  unique  to each country.
19.  The Sins of the Past.  The new, restructured  railway  should  commence  operation  with an
efficient  labor  force, adequate  financial  resources,  and  an appropriate  financial  structure. It may  well
be essential, similar to  the experience in Japan and the proposal in Germany, to  establish a
"settlements"  agency,  or its equivalent.  The settlements  agency  would  have  immediate  responsibility
for redundant  labor and administration  of labor redundancy  schemes  and re-training  programns.  If
there is excessive debt on the railway's current balance sheet, this excessive  debt should be
transferred  to the settlements  agency  as an obligation  which  can be managed  over time. Finally,  as
was the case in Japan, many  of the non-core  or non-rail  activities  and assets shol1d  be transferred
to the settlements  agency,  along  with  all uneconomic  properties  (such  as branch  lines  which  are being
closed)  which will not be operated  by the new  railway.1 4'  This has the benefit of prompting
railway  management  to focus  on railway  business  from  the outset  of the restructuring  and furnishing
a pool of assets which can be used over time to offset the labor redundancy  and excess debt
obligations  of the settlement  agency.  In any event, it separates  the issues associated  with past
policies  and practices  from the need to provide  viable  rail service  in the future.
20.  Reorganization.  The management  of the new railway  must develop a clear organization
chart showing  the assignment  of functions,  objectives,  and staffing  by activity  (profit  or cost)  center.
In general,  the activity  center should  either  be a line  of business  (including  both revenues  and costs
allocated  to the line of business),  or should  be a cost center in the case that certain  functions  (the
legal or accounting  departments)  will be centralized  in order to reduce  overhead  costs.
21.  Lines of Business. The railway  should  have  appropriate  lines  of business  activity  where  both
revenues and costs are collected  and compared.  These should reflect the differ, _.  markets the
railway  serves.  Generally,  these lines  of business  will be freight  (with appropriate  sub-lines  such
as coal, steel, international,  containers,  etc.), intercity  passenger  (with  appropriate  sub-markets  such
13! Any disadvantage  that the railway  inherits, such as deferred  maintenance  of track on commercially  viable  parts
of the network, should be reflected  in the values attached  to the relevant  assets in the initial balance sheet, rather
than in compensatory  capital grants to  overcome  backlog  needs  during  a transitional  period. The  latter  practice runs
the distinct risk of allowing  the existing  engineering  and  production  driven budgeting  approach to control a large
capital program which a commercially  driven management  would  probably not undertake  at all, and certainly  not
to the same  degree. The objective  is, as rapidly  as possible,  to permit commercial  considerations  to determine  what
assets are repaired or improved,  and to reflect only these values in the balance  sheet.  See Fukui.
14/  In Japan, the Settlements  Corporation  also "owns" the shares  of the new railways. If, and when, they are
tmly privatized, the Settlements  Corporation  will be able to use the  proceeds  to defray the costs of paying  off the
obligations  it assumed. Depending  on the time frame within which  sale of the stock to the public is to take place,
it may, or may  not, be appropriate  for the Settlements  Agency  to have ownership  and  control of the voting rights
of the railway's stock.14  Railway Reform in the Central and Eastern European (CEE)  Economies
as international,  long haul, regionall 5 s),  and suburban  passenger  services  (generally  broken down
by the major city around  which the subset  of suburban  services  is focused). Each line of business
activity  should  have its own assigned  emphasis  and should  own ana manage  (and pay for) its solely
related  facilities  such  as specialized  rolling  stock,  equipment  shops,  stations,  and  yards. The  purpose
of line of business  organization  is to permit  profit responsibility  to be assigned  at a level below  that
of the General  Manager.
22.  Infrastructure Accounting  and Maintenance.  As required in the European  Community
Directive,  a separate  "cost center" should  be established  to account  for infrastructure  maintenance
and construction  for facilities,  primarily  track structures,  electrification  and signalling,  which are
common  to more  than one line  of business. This  does not mean  that the so-called  "Swedish  Model"
of  establishing  a  separate and independent  agency to own and maintain the infrastructure is
necessarily  an appropriate  approach. It does mean that cost for infrastructure  should  be separated,
with the maintenance  of infrastructure  performed  in accordance  with (and only with) the business
needs of the railway, and that the management  of the infrastructure  maintenance  should  be fully
under control of  the railway's Executive.  As envisioned in the  Community  Directive, the
infrastructure  costing  should  also be adequate  for use in billing other railways  which may use the
infrastructure  of the owning  railway.
23.  Infrastructure Operations. A separate  cost center  should  be established  within  the railway
to manage  those parts of infrastructure  operations  which require integration  among the lines of
business. This would  include a common  train scheduling  unit and a train dispatching  unit which
would  operate  in accord  with  agreed  dispatching  rules  and service  priorities. Figure 15 (organization
chart) illustrates  one way 161  in which  these principles  might be put together.
24.  Ancillary, non-Rail Operations.  The railway should  divest itself of all non-rail related
activities, such as schools, hospitals,  and manufacturing  facilities  (signal  companies,  locomotive
manufacture,  etc).  Experience  indicates  that these types of activities  are performed much more
effectively  outside  the railway  in a market  economy.
MEASURES AND ISSUES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
25.  Experience  with railway  restructuring  to date indicates  that there will be a series  of critical
issues  of implementation  as the points  discussed  above  are brought  into  practice. In most instances,
these issues will apply  with particular  force to railway restructuring  programs  within the former
socialist  economies.
L.  Cultural Change. The railway  constitutes  a unique  culture  which,  in the past, has
been  highly engineering  and production  oriented,  even by comparison  with other
economic  entities  withir the country. In general,  existing  railway  personnel  will
resist the transition  to a market  oriented  method  of operation  because  it reduces
15/  In some cases, as in Britain, the regional line of business  will need to have separate status if there is a
separable  and large set of mral, 'regional" lines  which  constitute  a separate  activity  and whose  justification  is
primarily  local  or regional,  and not national. Other  examples  would  be the  state  and locally  supported  routes  of
Amtrak  in the US, or similar  activities  by SNCF  in France.
16  There  will  obviously  be many  altematives:  Figure  15 is illustrative  only.Figuere  15  Railwa §;lg llqe 15  ~~~Esxecutive
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their role, status  and security. Change  in the railway  culture  will require  forceful  action  on the part
of the government,  a clear definition  of the railway's  mission,  re-training  of railway  staff, and  hiring
from outside  the railway  to fill those key executive  positions  which  require  business  and marketing
skills. As  was the case  in BR,  JNR and Conrail,  it may  also  require  dismissal  of those  key  personnel
who do not fully support  the restructuring.
ii.  Redundant Labor.  The management  of redundant  labor is emerging  as one of
the key issues  in railway  restructuring  everywhere. That there is redundant  labor
in the CEE railways  is beyond  question: Polish  railways,  for example,  has nearly
twice as many  employees  as the entire  US railway  industry,  but only one-ninth  of
the traffic.  171  This labor force must flnd more productive  use elsewhere  in the
economy,  but  the transition  will have  to be supported  by financial  assistance,  such
as redundancy  payments  and a significant  re-training  effort, as well as help in
finding  other employment." 8 This issue will be one of the primary focuses  of
the settlement  agency.
iii.  Management Skills in a  Market Context.  A!,hough  they are often highly
competent  in the technical  and managerial  issues  of running  the railway, railway
management  in the CEE countries  often lack the techniques  and skills  necessary
for management  in  a  market economy, such as  strategic planning, market
definition and forecasting, traffic pricing, and financial modeling and investment
analysis. Over the short  term, this gap will almost  certainly  have to be filled  by
bringing  in a limited  number  of key executives  from outside  the railway, and by
an extensive  training  program  in management  skills.
iv.  Regulation. Most (with  the partial exception  of Hungary)  CEE railways  occupy
a position  of market  dominance,  even monopoly,  in many areas of the transport
system of their countries.  It will thus be necessary to focus on the development
and implementation  of an appropriate  system  of regulation  to control  the abuse  of
monopoly  power.  Several models  of such regulation  are available,' 9'  but the
emphasis  should  be on establishing  the absolute  minimum  of regulatory  authority
necessary  to control  market  abuse  so that  the old relationship  between  government
and railway  will simply  not be recreated  through  a regulatory  authority.
17/  Admittedly,  allowance  needs  to be made  for the much  higher  proportion  of (more labor-intensive)  passenger
operations  on Polish railways, but even so the relative  orders of magnitude  clearly  demonstrate  a serious degree of
labor redundancy.
18/  The design of redundancy payments  and other instruments for dealing with surplus labor needs to be
adapted to the particulars of each case -- for example,  where national unemployment  insurance  or social security
is inadequate, it may be necessary to allow dismissed  workers to retain health benefits or housing, at least for a
transition period.  Similarly, regional differences  should be taken into account: for example, the prospects for
finding  alternative  employment  will usually  be greater  in the capital cities than in more remote  regions. Lump sum
payments  may be more costly than monthly  payments,  but may be justified if they are more likely to be successful
(in part because  they provide employees  with the means to start small businesses). Voluntary  separation  schemes
need to be carefully targeted, to avoid losing key skills still needed by the enterprise.  For more on this, see
Galenson  and Havlicek.
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v.  Accounting. In general,  the books of account  of the CEE railways reflect the
management  policies  (if any) of public  authorities  in a planned  economy. They
suffer  both from the fact  that the structure  of the accounts  does  not provide  useful
business  management  information,  and the fact that  the input  information  on costs
of  inputs is  completely  distorted.  A  significant effort will be required to
restructure  the accounts  so that they  will support  decision  making  in the new lines
of business  and so  that they  will be adequately  responsive  to the input  cost  changes
which  will occur  over the next  few  years as prices are adjusted  to market  clearing
levels.
vi.  PSO Contracts.  The signing  of a PSO contract implies  a completely  different
relationship  between  railway  and governmental  authorities. The legal foundation
for this kind  of relationship  will be entirely  new  or may  not even  exist  at this time.
A significant  effort will be required in order to understand  the existing legal
framework  defining  relations  between  governmental  authorities  and suppliers  of
services  and to modify  this framework,  if required,  for effective  contract  provision
of rail services  by the railway  to government(s).
vii.  A New  Allocation  of Government Responsibilities. Under  the current, highly
centralized government  forms in the CEE countries, most local or  regional
authorities  do not have  the legal authority  or the financial  resources  necessary  to
carry out their side of a PSO  contract  for local services. If, as appears  desirable,
the local authorities  are going  to be asked  to take some share  of the responsibility
for planning  and funding  of regional  or local passenger  services  which  are not of
national  importance,  then  the authority  and resources  of local governments  vis a
vis national  government  will have to be appropriately  changed. 20'
viii.  The Private Sector. Although  great emphasis  has been placed  on converting  the
railway  to the JSC form, it appears  likely  that true and complete  "privatization'
of the railway  or some  of its major business  groups  (by which  is meant  actual  sale
of a majority  of the stock to the private sector) may be beyond the immediate
agendas  of the governments  involved. Privatization  also probably  awaits several
years of proven  performance  before  a price can reasonably  be placed  on the stock.
At the same  time, private  sector  development  (by which  is meant  a shifting  of the
boundary  between  the railway and the private sector)  is high.y desirable. This
could take a number of forms, including  sale of non-core  activities  to private
investors, contracting  with the private sector for provision of services (such as
equipment  maintenance)  which  are now provided  within  the railway, transfer  of
smaller  pieces  of the railway  for private sector operation  in connection  with the
railway, and  joint ventures  for the development  of real estate  which the railway
will continue  to own because  it is also essentially  for railway  services.
26.  The approach  discussed  above is sufficiently  ambitious  that a full description  of all of the
aspects  of the agenda  is beyond  the scope  of a summary  presentation  such  as this. Most  of the issues
are described  in greater detail in the sources  below.
7N/  See "Poland:  Decentralization  and Reform  of the State' in references  below.18  Railway  Reforim  In the Central  and Eastern  European (CEE) Economies
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